How does the EU ensure that its member states keep their budgets in check?

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for coordination of the economic policies of the EU member states. The treaty sets out the efforts to establish an Economic and Monetary Union and a single currency. Under the treaty, countries are required to have annual budget deficits not exceeding 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and government debt not exceeding 60% of GDP. The treaty also provides for supervision of these requirements.

The 1997 Stability and Growth Pact is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in the European Union pursue sound public finances. It has a ‘preventive arm’ and a ‘corrective arm’. The preventive arm is aimed at public income and expenditure in the medium term, and the corrective arm focuses on annual maximum government deficits and national debt. Although the member states remain responsible for budgetary policy, they are bound to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).


Tightening of rules in 2011

The financial and economic crisis has put this system under pressure. Consequently, rules have been tightened since 2011. The refined rules were included in the 2011 and 2013 six-pack and two-pack schemes, which, with the exception of the rule on penalties, apply to all EU member states. Possible penalties may be imposed on members of the euro area only. The six-pack scheme also marked the introduction of more stringent surveillance by means of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). The MIP is intended to promote, where necessary, structural reform in areas including employment, competitive positions, and the housing market. It constituted an addition to the (one-sided) attention given to public finances.

To learn more about the stages of budget surveillance, see:

To learn more about the stages of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, see:

The European Semester

The preventive arm of the SGP and the MIP mechanism converge in the European Semester. Since 2011, the European Commission has used the European Semester to coordinate the economic, budgetary and employment policies of the EU member states. It also includes assessment of the national reform programmes, which the member states submit as part of the Europe 2020 strategy.

The European Semester culminates in ‘country-specific’ recommendations of the Council. It takes place in the first half of the year to enable the member states to take these recommendations to heart when preparing their budgets in the second half of the year.

To learn more about the stages of the European Semester, see

On 20 May 2020 the European Commission published the new country specific recommendations. In these recommendations special attention is paid to the corona-crisis. The European Commission considers the European Semester to be a crucial part of the recovery strategy.  

  • More information on how the EU responds to the corona-crisis can be found here

Compliance and enforcement

Compliance with and enforcement of rules and agreements show a mixed picture. The 2014 Audit that we performed of European economic governance revealed that between 1997 and 2012, the European rules for surveillance of the budgetary policies of member states were not fully and consistently applied.

Countries were given notice very sparingly, and financial penalties were never imposed. Since 2011, the EU has had more options for surveillance and taking countries to task on their budgetary and macro-economic policies. However, the EU has only limited options for actually changing the policies pursued by member states. The corrective measures taken as part of budget surveillance are not enforceable at law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has no judicial authority in the area of budgetary policy. Formally, the Council of the European Union always has the final say, although the powers of the Commission have grown somewhat. In the end, establishing whether a member state has or has not complied with the budgetary criteria is a political decision taken by the Council, in response to a recommendation from the Commission. The Council’s decision is excluded from judicial review by the CJEU. The macro-economic imbalance procedure has to date been limited to the detection and prevention phases (i.e. issuing recommendations, combined with a request for an action plan if appropriate). The options under the correction phase, i.e. rejecting action plans or imposing penalties have not been used to date. 

An advisory report issued by the Council of State on request of the Dutch House of Representatives about compliance with the European agreements in the area of the Economic and Monetary Union confirms the impression of uneven enforcement, also for the years following the publication of our audit report in 2014 (not available in English).