Our criticisms of the Ministry of Defence’s calculations

In our audit report entitled Validation of the policy document ‘In the Interests of the Netherlands', we made clear to the Lower House of the Dutch parliament that we did not share the Minister’s confidence that a fleet of 37 JSFs would be sufficient not just to enable the armed forces to protect Dutch airspace around-the-clock, but also to have four aircraft available for long-term missions in other parts of the world and also to ensure that the armed forces have constant access to a team of fully trained pilots. Our reports and letters to the Lower House pinpointed a number of weak points in the Minister’s calculations. We wrote, for example, that the Minister had not made any provision for ‘guest pilots’ or ‘support pilots’, i.e. personnel who are required to keep their flying skills up to standard but are nonetheless not deployable as combat-ready pilots. Similarly, the Minister had not taken account of the fact that, during the period up to 2025, the air force would need to have many more aircraft stationed in the US for the initial training of the first group of pilots.

In response to our criticisms, the Minister improved the efficiency both of support flights and of the initial training of pilots in the US. On paper, the numbers should now work, provided that the JSF does not fall victim to the same maintenance problems as have afflicted other parts of the armed forces.

We also noted that the Minister’s calculations did not take account of the large number of flying hours taken up by missions. We took the following example to illustrate this point: in 2015, the air force used over three-quarters of the total flying hours budget for the mission flown by Dutch F-16s in Jordan.

What are the options for adjusting the calculation?

The calculation shows that the number of aircraft available for deployment on a mission depends on the number of combat-ready pilots. However, flying hours – and hence aircraft – are needed in order to get the pilots in question combat-ready. The air force has a number of options for adjusting the calculation.

• The five aircraft stationed in the US are needed because four new pilots need to receive initial training every year. This is based on the (Dutch air force’s) assumption that a pilot spends 10 years on active service before being promoted to another post. However, the air force could extend this period of active service so as to reduce the number of pilots who need to receive initial training. This, in turn, would reduce the number of aircraft that need to be stationed in the US. There would, however, be a disadvantage in the form of diminished career prospects for the pilots.
• The figure of 210 flying hours per aircraft per annum is a choice. In the past, the F-16s used to log 180 flying hours a year, a number that has in fact now fallen to just 164. The higher the number of annual flying hours, the higher the operating costs (which are limited in the case of the JSF) and the sooner the aircraft needs to be replaced.
• An annual operational training programme of 180 hours is based on NATO guidelines. This is the number of hours actually flown and is separate from the time spent training with simulators. In other words, there is no advantage to be gained from reducing the length of the annual operational training programme and spending more time training with simulators. However, as simulators improve, so a new NATO guideline could be agreed for the annual operational training programme.
• It would theoretically be possible to restrict the 20% deduction for flying hours that do not form an effective contribution to combat-readiness. For example, the air force is planning to organise the flying hours for support pilots more efficiently. Although this is a step forward on paper, it is as yet unclear whether it will have any practical effect.
• The NATO guideline of two pilots per aircraft on missions is the result of a desire to make maximum use of each aircraft. If the Netherlands were to allocate just one pilot per aircraft for missions, there would be a steep decline in the effectiveness of each aircraft.
• The air force can suspend operational training activities during missions. This is the course of action taken by the air force in the past, and has seriously undermined both the combat-readiness and the deployability of pilots.

In our accountability audits of the Ministry of Defence in 2014, 2015 and 2016, we already concluded that a lack of operational training seriously undermined the combat-readiness and deployability of air force personnel. Due to the limited scope of the activities undertaken during missions, the pilots engaged on missions are no longer combat-ready. Without any form of operational training, there is a very swift decline in the number of combat-ready pilots available to the air force. This is a trend that can be reversed only once the mission in question comes to an end. This means that the air force cannot continue to engage in missions over a prolonged period of time.

It was for these reasons that we were unable to share the Minister of Defence’s confidence that ‘a fleet of 37 JSFs would be sufficient not just to enable the armed forces to protect Dutch airspace around-the-clock, but also to have four aircraft available for long-term missions in other parts of the world and also to ensure that the armed forces have constant access to a team of fully trained pilots.’