Armed forces providing effective support in disasters and crises
Lack of policy creates risk of competition with other tasks of the armed forces
Besides protecting the territorial integrity of the Netherlands and its allies, the Dutch armed forces have two other main tasks, one being supporting civil authorities in national disasters and other crises, such as floods, wildfires, pandemics and major disturbances of the peace. In the period we investigated (2021-June 2024) the armed forces fulfilled this task effectively. Yet future fulfilment of the third main task might be at risk: the Minister of Defence has not yet taken a decision on how the armed forces’ limited capacity should be applied for territorial protection or for civil support. As a result, these two tasks might compete with each other, especially now that greater demands are being made on the armed forces capacity to protect territorial integrity. The availability of personnel and equipment to support citizens could come under pressure. This is a matter of concern because the third task is of critical importance to national security.
Figure 1 Focus on first main task puts third main task at risk
Third main task: disaster relief in the Netherlands
The Netherlands’ armed forces have three main tasks: 1. Protection of national and allied territory; 2. Maintenance and promotion of the international legal order and stability; and 3. Support for civil authorities in national law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid. The third main task includes a number of recurring activities such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), coastguard operations and the deployment of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and incidental support in the event of natural disasters (e.g. the floods in Limburg in 2021) and disruptions of the peace (e.g. the curfew riots in 2020/2021). The Minister of Defence has no insight into the expenditure, but the Court of Audit estimates that he spends at least €674 million a year on support for civil authorities.
Armed forces not 100% prepared for emergencies
The Minister of Defence honoured 404 requests from civil authorities for incidental support between 2021 and end-June 2024. A large proportion of the requests (37%) were made by the four major cities in the Randstad conurbation and related mainly to support for criminal tasks and law enforcement. In total, 5,868 members of the armed forces were deployed. The armed forces were able to fulfil all the requests but our investigation found that not all units were 100% operationally prepared at the time.
Not all guaranteed capacities were demonstrably operationally prepared
| Operationele gereedheid | Capaciteit |
|---|---|
| 100% | 25x military advisers for security regions |
| 100% | Detachment of 3,000 military personnel |
| 0% | Temporary response to large numbers of people at defence complexes |
| 100% | Search capacities |
| 100% | 2x EOD (IEDD) team, including disposal robots |
| 100% | 2x EOD (IEDD/CBRN) team, including disposal robots |
| 100% | 1x CBRN Advice and Assistance (A&A) response team |
| 100% | 1x CBRN Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) response team |
| 10% | 1x CBRN decontamination capacity |
| 100% | 2x coastguard vessels for the protection of ports |
| 100% | 2x combined units for the protection of port |
| 0% | 3x maritime EOD diving team, including disposal robot |
| 100% | Unit to protect and secure military assets and areas |
| 100% | Fire helicopters to fight wildfire |
| 40% | Mobile detection system with sensors to protect military assets and areas |
| 30% | Small unmanned aircraft to protect and secure military assets and areas |
| 30% | 1x engineering corps, including technical advisory capacity |
| 100% | 2x folding bridge as emergency bridge and emergency raft |
| Unknown | Support staff to direct operations during disasters and crises |
| 100% | 350x tracked and wheeled vehicles to evacuate disaster areas |
There are capacity constraints regarding the EOD maritime response, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear operations (CBRN), the mobile detection system, small unmanned aircraft to protect and secure military assets and areas and the engineering corps. The capacity constraints are due in part to lack of personnel and specialised equipment. That support was nevertheless provided in all cases is thanks in part to the armed forces’ “can-do” attitude and the military’s willingness to act in difficult and dangerous circumstances.
Clarification needed on what civil authorities can expect
The minister needs a clear understanding of the capacity that is (and should be) available for the third main task and of the consequences of applying more capacity for the first main task. The Minister of Defence should regularly evaluate policy on the armed forces’ provision of support; he does not at present. The minister should explain more clearly what civil authorities can expect (and what, in future, they perhaps cannot), as their disaster relief, law enforcement and humanitarian aid response sometimes relies entirely on the armed forces. The minster will have to set priorities and obtain a full insight into expenditure on the third main task and evaluate it. Only then can he account for expenditure correctly and can the House of Representatives scrutinise policy effectively.