The third main task of the Dutch armed forces

The third main task of the Dutch armed forces is to support civil authorities by providing disaster relief, law enforcement and humanitarian aid. This task includes a number of structural activities such as the disposal of explosives and the policing of airports. The armed forces also provide incidental support to civil authorities when necessary, for instance in response to natural disasters, major disturbances of the peace and threats to public health, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The Minister of Defence spends at least €674 million a year on this third main task.

We investigated whether the minister achieved the goals of the third main task between 2021 and the end of June 2024. To express a considered opinion, we audited the preparation, implementation and evaluation of policy and its funding.

The investigation was prompted by the increase in requests for the armed forces’ limited capabilities. The relevance of this has increased since the beginning of our investigation owing to the deterioration in the security situation of the Netherlands, Europe and NATO allies.

Shortcomings in the Minister of Defence’s preparation and evaluation of policy

The Court of Audit concludes that policy on the armed forces’ third main task is fragmented. Our reconstruction of policy also found that goals were not sufficiently realistic and consistent. The Minister of Defence has not decided what should be done if simultaneous requests are made for the armed forces’ scarce capabilities and how they should be allocated. This could occur at, for instance, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), where the provision of military support must be weighed against the performance of routine tasks such as border control and security and protection duties. The third main task’s goals are not fully aligned with the civil authorities’ needs and the balance between the availability of and demand for civil-military cooperation is poor. We also conclude that the Minister of Defence does not evaluate policy on the third main task and so cannot learn from experience and make improvements where necessary.

The Minister of Defence has insufficient insight into expenditure

The Court of Audit concludes that the Minister of Defence cannot say or establish how much public money is spent on the armed forces’ third main task. This is a matter of concern not only on accountability and efficiency grounds but also with a view to parliament’s right to approve the budget. We calculate that on average the minister spends at least €674 million a year on the third main task. 

Effective support from the Minister of Defence for civil authorities

The Court of Audit concludes that the Minister of Defence effectively supports civil authorities, despite the shortcomings in policy preparation and evaluation. The armed forces have always carried out structural tasks for civil authorities. We also note that the Minister of Defence honoured all 447 requests from civil authorities for incidental assistance and support, even though not all the guaranteed capabilities were operationally prepared. This is characteristic of the armed forces’ “can-do” mentality, but it also means that the Minister of Defence might have been unable to provide all the guaranteed capabilities if they had been requested. We found that military personnel were fully committed to fulfilling the third main task even in difficult and dangerous circumstances. 

Practical examples

We concluded from 4 practical examples that the Minister of Defence supported civil authorities effectively. For example, fire helicopters were deployed to fight wildfires and the explosives disposal unit disposed of more than 9,000 explosives. The National Support Organisation assisted the National Police in enforcing public order during the “curfew riots”. The armed forces also supported civil authorities during the floods in Limburg in 2021.

The Minister of Defence must take a decision on civil-military cooperation

The Minister of Defence must brace himself for more and more complex military and non-military threats affecting all the armed forces’ main tasks, both at home and abroad. The Court of Audit concludes that there is a real risk of the armed forces’ main tasks competing with each other and supplanting each other. With more focus being concentrated on the first main task, it is increasingly uncertain whether the Minister of Defence will be able and willing to fulfil the third main task in the future. This is a matter of concern because civil authorities are sometimes fully reliant on the armed forces for disaster relief, law enforcement and humanitarian aid. Smooth civil-military cooperation is of critical importance to national security. 

Figure 1: Focus on first main task puts third main task at risk

Schematic representation of the armed forces’ main tasks. A brief explanation is provided of each task.
The scales show the 3 main tasks of the Dutch armed forces. The first main task is to protect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands and its allies. The second is to maintain and promote the international legal order and stability. And the third main task is to support civil authorities in disasters and crises. The scales are tipping over to the first main task.

Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, we make the following recommendations to the Minister of Defence: 

  • Clarify what consequences the focus on the first main task will have for the future fulfilment of the third main task. Take account of the third main task’s importance to national security and in particular to the civil authorities that depend on the armed forces. 
  • In consultation with the Minister of Justice and Security, evaluate the availability of guaranteed capabilities for military support and assistance. Invest in the mutual transparency regarding the availability of and demand for civil-military capabilities and strengthen expectations management in order to mitigate risks to national security.
  • Evaluate policy on the third main task and strengthen policy and accountability based on insight into the public money spent on the armed forces’ operational preparedness. Evaluation is necessary to improve and adapt policy where necessary, also in the light of the worsening threat situation.